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Abstract
A court case raised by a group of San (former) hunter-gatherers, protesting against relocation from the Central
Kalahari Game Reserve, has attracted considerable international attention. The Government of Botswana argues
that the relocation was done in order to ‘improve the lives’ of the residents, and that it was in their own best interest.
The residents plead their right to stay in their traditional territories, a right increasingly acknowledged in international
law, and claim that they did not relocate voluntarily. The case started in 2004 and will, due to long interspersed
adjournments, go on into 2006.
This article traces the events that led up to the case, and reports on its progress thus far.  The case is seen as an
arena for expressing and negotiating the relationship between an indigenous minority and the state in which they
reside. The article discusses different aspects of this relationship as illuminated by the current court case, concluding
that the favoured development ideals of a modern homogenous state have shaped policies that are unwilling to
accommodate alternative development models favoured by the San.
The analysis shows how international solidarity and support have been essential for the San to be able to present
their grievances, but at the same time argues that Survival International’s campaign against Botswana diamonds
may sidetrack the work for necessary changes in the national development policy.
1 The background
The Government of Botswana’s homepage has a
special section on ‘Relocation of Basarwa’, setting out
the official position on a case of relocation that has
caused both national and international concern.  A
succinct summary (downloaded  April 2005) states that:
There has never been any forceful relocation of
Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
(CKGR).
There is no mining nor any plans for future mining
anywhere inside the CKGR.
The intention of Government is to bring the
standards of living of Basarwa up to the level
obtaining in the rest of the country, as well as to
avoid land use conflicts in the CKGR.
And the homepage goes on to complain:
In a world where Governments stand accused of
many terrible crimes, it does seem strange that
the Botswana Government should have to defend
itself against the charge of improving the lives of
its citizens.  (www.gov.bw/basarwa)
This article is about the charges against the present
policy of the government of Botswana, and asks what
‘improving the lives’ of its citizens might mean. The
specific acts of improvement are the relocations in 1997
and 2002 of the inhabitants of the Central Kalahari
Game Reserve, one of the largest game reserves in
the world. Disagreement on the government position
is expressed most strongly by 243 San (Basarwa) and
Bakgalagadi who have taken the government to court
over the relocation.1
The court case started in 2004, it is presently
adjourned, and is expected to finish in 2006.  It raises
questions on different levels: There are questions of
facts: was the relocation voluntary? There are questions
of policy: was the relocation necessary? There are
questions of justice: do the San in question fall within
the notion of aboriginal rights as developed in
international law, and if so, should Botswana defer to
this fact?
The article focuses on the relationship between the
San minority and the state, seeing the present court
case as one arena where this relationship is expressed
and negotiated. In demographic terms the relocation
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has only affected a small proportion of the San. Some
2500  have been involved directly, if one considers
fluctuations in settlement and kinship networks across
reserve borders, maybe 4-5 000 are affected out of an
estimated population of 50,000 San.  However, the
relocation has attracted attention because it has taken
on the symbolic significance of ‘a last stand’. In fact,
most San in Botswana have been relocated or
dispossessed, but in less dramatic manners: some
because of other game reserves set up  after
Independence in 1966 (Chobe, Moremi, Khutse) but
most of them because of the centralisation to small
settlement that is the cornerstone of the Remote Area
Development  Programme. Currently a large number
are affected by relocation because of a fencing policy
that effectively banishes San from cattle-posts, most
notably in the Central District, just east of the CKGR,
making them ‘squatters on their own land’ (Bishop
1998).  Unfortunately, they do not attract the same
amount of media interest, probably because of the
gradual nature of this dispossession.
The attention is also due to the very specific
justification for establishing the reserve. The Central
Kalahari Game Reserve was set aside in February
1961, by the then Bechuanaland Government, to
‘protect wildlife resources and reserve sufficient land
for traditional land use by hunter gatherer communities
of the Central Kgalagadi’ estimated at that time to
number approximately 4000 (Fact-Finding Mission
1985). George Silberbauer, Bushmen Survey Officer
presented his recommendation for a reserve
(Savingram no. 10840 111 (25) of 9 February 1961)
based on extensive fieldwork of the traditional
adaptation (published  as The Bushman Survey in 1965,
see also Silberbauer 1981).
The Kalahari  is a semi-desert, with  no permanent
surface water, poor soil, great variation in rainfall and
frequent droughts. Out of necessity, the G|ui, G||ana
and Tsila, and Bakgalagadi, a Bantu group which has
cohabited with the San for centuries, have developed
highly flexible land-use strategies in order to cope with
an uncertain environment (Tanaka 1980; Ikeya 1999;
Hitchcock 2002). Foraging provided a crucial source
of subsistence and income in the Kalahari, as it was
gradually combined with the keeping of small stock
(goats), the manufacture of crafts, and kind or cash
payments received from various government schemes
or occasional  jobs on the neighbouring Ghanzi farms.
In the early stage of the reserve (1969) a borehole
was installed in Xade, the largest settlement. The year-
round availability of clean water attracted San from other
camps and within 15 years  Xade’s population increased
to  more than 1000 people. In 1982 the government
built a school and health centre to serve the needs of
this community, and the people of Xade began to
cultivate crops and brought dogs, goats, donkeys and
horses into the reserve, to use for transport and hunting.
The CKGR is an extremely fragile ecosystem, and
in the mid 1980s the possession of livestock led to
questions of whether people and wildlife could coexist
within the Reserve. A Mission was established  to look
at the challenges of combining environmental protection
with ‘the socio-economic development of the remote
area dwellers’ (Fact-Finding Mission1985). The main
recommendation was that the residents of the CKGR
be permitted to remain in their traditional areas,
incorporated into a new Wildlife  Management Area,
while the northern part of CKGR should remain a game
reserve. The Ministry in charge, however, decided that
the social and economic development of Xade and other
settlements in the reserve should be frozen and that
viable sites for economic and social devlopment should
be identified outside the reserve. The residents of the
Reserve  should be encouraged – but not forced – to
relocate at those sites.
When Silberbauer was called as the first expert
witness at the opening of the court case in 2004, he
emphasised that the main objective of the Reserve was
to protect the food supplies of the existing Bushman
population, against commercial hunters coming in from
neighbouring farms.  The easiest way to achieve this
was to use existing legislation, and to declare it a game
reserve. According to Silberbauer, a ‘Native reserve’,
or in this case a ’Bushman reserve’ was also considered
at that time, but this was seen as legally more complex,
and politically more controversial, and it was left as an
option that could be realised later.  This decision, as he
put it, held ‘an element of expediency rather than
duplicity’.
It appears that although the protectorate
government had been liberal in establishing ‘Native
reserves’ with a fair degree of autonomy granted to
Tswana chiefs,  the G|ui and G||ana  were not  perceived
as political entities to be negotiated with on that level.
Nevertheless, the rationale behind the reserve is
strikingly parallel to the contemporary concept of
safeguarding ‘collective rights’ to land that a group has
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.  The
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question now is to what degree such collective rights
that in effect were protected by the establishment of
the game reserve now can serve as a protection against
relocation. The position of the Government of Botswana
is clear on this, according to the counsel for the
respondents: ‘The history and the motivation for the
declaration of the CKGR is irrelevant and inadmissible’.
The court case illustrates a global trend: prospects
for hunter-gatherers exercising their livelihood are less
determined by the sustainability of their environment,
and more by  the  premises laid down by states and
transnational economies (see Hitchcock 1996;
Anderson & Ikeya 2001).  The effect may be direct:
hunting regulations, relocation directives, or indirect:
wildlife reduced by fencing, veterinary cordons and
cattle ranching. Loss of control over territories is the
common denominator.
Increasingly, relationships between hunter-gatherer
communities, and the state laying down the conditions,
are seen to fall under the conceptual umbrella of
‘indigenous peoples’ as this has developed in
international law (Niezen 2003; IWGIA 2004; Kenrick
& Lewis 2004; Crawhall 2005). This is not an
uncontroversial observation in Africa. Readers of Before
Farming may be familiar with the discussion between
Suzman (2002) and Corry (2003), and the Botswana
Government rejects the relevance of the concept
outright. However, in this article it is suggested that an
understanding of indigenous or aboriginal rights brings
out some salient features of state-minority relations
concerning many minorities in Africa, including the San
minority in Botswana. This understanding provides a
sub-text, both when the term ‘indigenous’  is not formally
used, and/or when it is rejected (Saugestad 2001a,b,
2004).
2 Relocation 2002 and the court case
The events that triggered legal action took place in
January and February 2002.  It  finalised a process
that had started in 1997, when all residents of Xade,
the largest settlement, had their  possessions loaded
onto trucks and transported to the resettlement village
of New Xade to the west of  the CKGR, and Kaudwane,
south of the reserve. During this second round of
removals, storage tanks for water were overturned,
water points were sealed, remaining social services
withdrawn. People, household utensils, blankets, huts,
dogs and domestic animals were loaded on trucks and
taken to the new resettlement locations. Ironically, this
was at the same time as a large United Nations
conference was convened in the capital, Gaborone, on
the theme: ‘Peaceful and constructive group
accommodation in situations involving minorities and
indigenous peoples’ (UNCHR 2002).2
Directly after the relocation 2002, a court case was
raised as a matter of urgency. The case was
spearheaded by the organisation First People of the
Kalahari (FPK) and the Botswana chapter of the
Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern
Africa (WIMSA), together with a Negotiation Team set
up in conjunction with the first round of relocations. The
Negotiation Team included two representatives from
each of the CKGR settlements, and legal advisers.
Funding was provided through a ‘CKGR Legal Rights
Support Coalition’, a loose coalition of international
human rights NGOs, and with Ditshwanelo, Botswana
Centre of Human Rights, as its secretariat. The
preparations had been going on for some years, with
registration of applicants and the mapping of traditional
land use, but the option of a court case had been
pending, as many argued for negotiations as the
preferred strategy, and a court case only as a last resort.
After the evictions, the applicants, FPK and their legal
advisers, felt that there was no longer a choice.  When
the case was raised there was an expectation that it
could be heard and concluded within a year (‘in time
for the resident to return before the next rainy season’,
starting October/November). Thus the claim was
formulated with a focus on restoring essential services.
In April 2002 an application was brought to the High
Court  in the matter between Roy Sesana and  242
others, the Applicants, and the Attorney General ‘in his
capacity as the recognised agent of the Government
of the Republic of Botswana’, the Respondent. The case
contains the following elements:
● whether it was unlawful for the Government of
Botswana to terminate basic and essential services
to the Residents of the Game Reserve in January
2002
● whether the Government has an obligation to
restore services to the Residents
● whether the Residents were in possession of their
land and were deprived of such possession forcibly,
wrongly and without their consent
● whether the Government’s refusal to issue Game
Licenses to the Residents and to allow them to
enter the CKGR is unlawful and unconstitutional. 3
The position of the applicants is that the people in
question have used  the territory in question,
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uninterrupted since time immemorial, and that they
should be able to enjoy the services in their home
territory.  According to the criteria set out in the ILO
Convention 169 of 1989, the UN Draft Declaration on
Indigenous Rights, and numerous other documents, the
inhabitants of Central Kalahari are indigenous people
and should have a right to occupation.
The position of the Government of Botswana is that
it is not bound by these declarations. Continued
settlement is incompatible with wildlife conservation and
development of the tourism potential of the reserve,
because residents have increasingly taken up non-
sustainable activities such as keeping livestock and
growing crops. The stated intention of the Government
is to bring the standards of living of Basarwa up to a
level obtaining in the rest of the country as well as to
avoid land use conflict in the CKGR (www.gov.bw/
basarwa/background.html).
In his opening statement, the  counsel for the
applicants emphasised what he saw as the main issue
in the case: the right to choose.
This case is about the rights of the applicants to
choose where and how they live. It is about their
freedom to determine for themselves when, and
how and at what pace they will join the outside
world. This was the philosophy which underpinned
the creation of the reserve, and to which
Silberbauer will testify.
It must not be a beauty contest.  The case is not
about whether it is in the best interest of the
residents to stay inside CKGR or to be relocated,
it is not about whether they do or can or should
pursue a traditional life as hunter-gatherers.
It is not about the wisdom of government policy
that they should or must be integrated, or about
the amount of money that the government may or
may not have devoted to the implementation of
this policy.
It is about the lawfulness and constitutionality of
the course adopted by government. However well
intended it may be, has the government gone
about things in a lawful and proper way?
We say it has not.
Not surprisingly, as the case has developed it has
to a large extent become a ‘beauty contest’.  A large
contingent of international media covered the first
couple of weeks of the case, and understandably the
lead counsel for the respondent, Sidney Pilane, used
the opportunity to present the good intentions of the
government. Even after the first flurry of reporting, the
case has been regularly reported on in the national
press. A  propensity for rhetoric has been time
consuming. When the court adjourned in September
2005 it had been in session for 25 weeks, and is
scheduled to reconvene February 2006. So far the court
has heard all witnesses for the applicants, and has
started on the witnesses for the respondents, while 20
names remain on the government’s list. Initially, it was
anticipated that the case would last for two to three
weeks in Ghanzi, to hear witnesses for the applicants,
and two weeks at the High Court in Lobatse to hear the
witnesses for the respondents.  Looking back, this
incredibly optimistic and unrealistic estimate of the
amount of time the case would take, demonstrates
perhaps better than anything else the degree to which
the case is unprecedented and  unpredictable.
There is more than the usual degree of uncertainty
about both proceedings and outcome.  Botswana has
a common law system where cases are determined on
the basis of precedence, but there is no precedence in
similar cases in Botswana.  There is an obvious parallel
across the border in South Africa, where the ¤Khomani
won an extraordinary victory in the 1999 settlement,
which restored to them a large section of the Kgalagadi
Transfrontier park, an area from which they had been
banished in stages between 1930 and the 1960s
(Chennells & du Toit 2004; ¤Khomani San nd).4
However, the ¤Khomani land claim was settled out of
court. There is also the Richtersveld case, where the
notion of ‘aboriginal title’ was invoked.  Although the
South African Restitution Act played an important part
in the verdict of the Constitutional Court, it was also
seen as an ‘open door’ to the application of indigenous
law ownership. Chan (2004:129) notes  ‘the full extent
of the impact of the Richtersveld holding in South Africa
and as a precedent in other sub-Saharan African
countries remains to be seen.’
3 The issues
The court case is part of a wider debate about the
position of the San in Botswana, and how their rights
as citizens are promoted and protected.  Both within
the court case and in the public debate there are
conflicting and competing representations of what does
and does not benefit the San. Some of the most salient
perspectives can be summed up under four headings:
● the facts about relocation: was it voluntary?
● the justifications for relocation: economic and
ecological considerations
● different development models: the notion of
modernity and ‘improving their lives’
● different forms of outsider influence.
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3.1 To what extent was the relocation
voluntary?
The government of Botswana claims the moving was
voluntary.  On the whole no physical violence was used.
But an extremely poor section of the population was
presented with a merciless choice. They were given to
understand that those who stayed on would be
abandoned:  there would be no access to water, health
facilities, education for their children. For those who
chose to move, there would be compensation money,
cattle, ample public facilities. As noted in a Ditshwanelo
(1996) report before relocation: ‘Those who are leaving,
are leaving in sorrow, those who are staying, are staying
in sorrow’.
Except for Xade, which was completely cleared out
in 1997, services were upheld to the other smaller
settlements, and the threat of cutting services only took
effect in 2002. But in the 10 years following a decision
in 1986 to freeze all development inside the reserve
(MCI 1986) pressure had increased, and by and large
the residents of the CKGR were not given much choice.
A former Ghanzi  District Commissioner, called as
witness, claimed in a testimony on the 1997 relocation
from Xade that  the residents had found life unbearable
and wanted to move.  He cited as evidence a letter
written by one Kuela Kiema in 1995, on behalf of the
Xade community members. The letter expressed
concerns about the conditions at Xade and said a
majority  of the people had accepted the government’s
plans to move them out of CKGR (Mmegi 18.08.05).
As it happened, Kuela Kiema, now a student at the
University of Namibia, commented on the same letter
at a seminar in Trømso November 2001.  His
interpretation was different. He told of a history of
harassment of the Xade community, and of pestering
at school where he was told ‘you Masarva you should
move out of the reserve’. After many years of
persecution, he had come to the conclusion that the
pressure was overwhelming, and the community would
only be left in peace if they agreed to move.
I made up my mind to do something to save my
people. I made the final decision against my will.
I analysed the situation and made a decision to
save the poor souls from further torturing. Did I
like the decision? Not at all! It was pain in my soul
that forced me to make the decision.
What was the decision? It was as simple as joining
the enemy (government) and speak its language,
convincing everybody (my people) that what the
government said was of the utmost importance to
us, the San.
What about the land rights issue? Of course it was
not and is not my will to give up our mother land
without our consent. I will never in my lifetime
admit that we moved out of our land willingly. I will
whenever conditions allow, always join hands with
those who are fighting for our land, because it was
pain and despair  that forced me to turn a blind
eye to FPK’s attempts to fight for our land. [This
was at the beginning of FPK’s campaign.]
I prepared  a letter and sent it to the District
Commissioner stating we want to move out of the
game reserve because we want to get cattle from
government, sound health, education and other
social amenities. The District Commissioner was
very happy. He called us and thanked us for a
making a wise decision…
I won the battle… I won to lose my land, my only
heritage from my forefathers. I won against my
will (notes from presentation, and Kiema 2001) .
The same experience of relentless pressure can be
discerned in the witnesses’ record of how they
experienced the relocation events of 2002. The
evidence is very clear that the show of force, in terms
of large numbers of vehicles and people in uniforms,
was perceived as overwhelming. They all say ‘we were
told to move, we were not asked’ and several use terms
like  ‘we gave up hope’.
The purpose of giving evidence is to establish facts
according to a predefined  set of procedures.  The
purpose of cross examination is to question the same
facts. The opportunities to create doubt are manifold
when the witnesses are illiterate speakers of languages
containing four click sounds for which there are no sign
in the Latin alphabet, and when their customs differ
from those of the majority society in many other respects
as well.  To give a few examples: Names were written
down by lawyers or bureaucrats with no language
training, and the spelling invariably differed.  Much time
was taken up with identifying the most correct version.
Another issue of contention was place of birth. More
often than not those issuing identity cards (Omang) after
independence (1966) would have to guess both at the
date and place of birth. It is not inconceivable that an
officer might put down as place of birth the nearest
familiar settlement (even outside the reserve) instead
of a local name in the vernacular, and such inaccuracies
would have been of little consequence until contested
during the court case.
Many of the witness statements tell how the
relocation process created division within families.
Different family members were approached separately,
and if one agreed, this was used as a lever against the
others. Spouses were approached individually, not as
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couples, and offered individual relocation agreements.
Women were told their common law marriages were
not recognised in the Tswana system, because they
‘did not wear a wedding ring’, and they should leave on
their own.  Children were told they were entitled to
compensation and benefits, and should not wait for their
parents. One witness  gave a vivid description of how
his children were being persuaded by the government
officials to go and talk to their mother to give her Omang
to them. ‘The children did that because they noticed
that the police were now getting into the huts removing
property from the huts themselves.  And so the children
talked to their mother and hand over her Omang so
that they could  move, because it was a fight.’
The above examples express resistance to
relocation. Even though it  may be self-evident,  it is
important also to recognise that in 1997, and even to
some degree in 2002, there were some who genuinely
agreed to relocate. San from inside the Central Kalahari
can no more be expected to be uniform in aspirations
for themselves and their families than any other
population group. It may also be the case, as some
argue, that relocation to a place providing clean water
and easy access to clinic and school, was more
attractive to women than to men, and what some men
saw as interference in family affairs ‘luring’ the
womenfolk away, might reflect real disagreement within
some families.  A proper answer to this question would
require interviews with the women in question. On the
other hand, there is little  indication of  such a division
along gender line in the list of applicants, which  includes
61%  women.
3.2 Justifications for relocation
The actual cost of providing services to small groups
located in extremely remote areas with poor roads is a
legitimate concern. A Remote Area Development
Programme provides services to smaller groups of
people in more remote parts of the country than the
standard settlement policy provides for. Providing
services inside the CKGR is expensive, in absolute
terms. But the level of services provided, especially
after the 1997 relocation was modest indeed (water,
destitute rations, visit by a mobile clinic, transport of
school children to hostels outside the reserve), and
there was a de facto understanding that residents within
CKGR would have to move outside to partake in the
full benefits of education or job opportunities.  Over the
years many residents of the Central Kalahari have
chosen to move out, to engage in opportunities not
available inside the reserve.  But the argument is that it
is precisely this element of choice that now has been
denied the inhabitants. Services could have been
maintained for a considerable period of time inside
CKGR for the amount now spent on infrastructure in
the new resettlement locations, compensation and
welfare assistance, and the court case. The offer by
donors, most recently the European Union, to cover
the cost of services, has been declined.  But economy
is no longer a main issue.
The question of whether or how wildlife and humans
can cohabit, is of more significance. The question is
approached partly with reference to law, as a very
simple proposition:  it is a game reserve and people
are not allowed to reside inside a game reserve. The
wider debate has concentrated on the carrying capacity
of the reserve. This aspect has taken up the greater
part of the time used in the case so far, pitting against
each other the two expert witnesses on ecology.
The applicants argue that people have lived
sustainably with wildlife as far back as human records
go. Arthur Albertson, expert witness for the applicants,
concludes that there is no scientific evidence that any
CKGR species has declined, or is declining, on account
of the Reserve’s resident communities.  CKGR wildlife
population dynamics are primarily influenced by rainfall,
and movement between the Reserve and adjacent
areas (Albertson 2001a, b, testimony in court). His
observations on traditional territories and conservation
management show that:
● the CKGR communities occupy clearly defined
traditional territories, which encompass all natural
resources required to meet their long-term needs.
As such, territories are self-contained ecological
and economic units, and the communities have in-
depth knowledge of local faunal and floral
dynamics
● within their respective traditional territories, they
employ highly complex and flexible land-use
strategies that have successfully sustained them
for many generations - even during drought - yet
without harming the ecosystems on which they
depend.
It has been difficult for counsel for the respondent
to refute Albertson’s observations, as no similar work
has been done within the CKGR providing alternative
conclusions. Much of the cross examination centred
not around the facts as presented, but  around
Albertson’s professional  qualifications -  claimed to be
insufficient -  and possible weaknesses in his scientific
methods (he holds a BSc in Zoology and Botany, and
an Honours in Wildlife management).
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In contrast, the expert witness for the respondent,
Kathleen Alexander, has a PhD in veterinary medicine,
and an impressive list of scientific publications on animal
diseases, but no record of research in the CKGR. The
thrust of Alexander’s testimonies so far (she has not
yet been cross examined) has concentrated on
disturbance factors, particularly the dangers of disease
transmission from domestic animals to wildlife
population, hence the need to exclude domestic animals
and minimise human development in parks and game
reserves.
The government’s case is that they have not
expelled traditional hunter-gatherers, as indeed they
ceased to rely on hunting and gathering many decades
ago. It is their increasing exercise of agropastoralism
that endangers the wildlife, and this activity should be
taken outside the reserve.  The case, however, will not
be solved through an agreement on nuances in the
development of wildlife biomass or disease
transmission. What is clear is that any  permitted return
to the CKGR, be it through a negotiated settlement or
a court decision in favour of the applicants, would be
circumscribed by strict land use regulations.
Ironically, such a plan already exists.  A Third
Draft Management Plan was prepared by the
Department of Wildlife and National Parks (2001),
based on consultations with the Central Kalahari
communities and FPK. The plan introduces the
concept of Community Use Zones, and is designed
to allow the San to utilise their traditional territories
inside the CKGR with two main objectives in mind:
1) to maintain the integrity of ecosystems and
promote biodiversity, and 2) to ensure the socio-
economic sustainability of residents of the CKGR.
Only the most sustainable hunting, gathering and
farming methods were to be permitted within the
CUZ. The plan was finalised in 2001 and was
approved by the relevant District Councils (Ghanzi
and Kweneng), but was replaced by a Draft Final
after the relocations in 2002, with a drastically
reduced scope for community involvement.
The moot point, aboriginal rights, is not solved by
the debate on the carrying capacity of traditional land
use practices. However, the claim that the G|ui, G||ana
and Tsila have resided in the area now known as Central
Kalahari  ‘since time immemorial’ has not been disputed,
and, one may add, it would be very difficult scientifically
to do so.
3.3 A question of values: the notion of modernity
The legacy of the historical relationship between
dominant Tswana groups and San subordinates provide
some of the key to an understanding of the current
situation in Botswana.  While many Europeans, in the
van der Post tradition, may still see the Bushmen as
the last representatives of values and lifestyles that
have long been lost in western civilisation, the average
Batswana see the Bushmen representing a not very
distant past of physical hardship and material scarcity
from which the Batswana want to disassociate
themselves.
Basic values of Tswana life are connected with the
social order of village life, and give weight to the
recurrent argument that the Basarwa should leave their
nomadic ways and become settled, ie, more civilised.
Post-colonial nation-building strengthened the
hegemony of the majority. In the geo-political climate
of the 1960s and 1970s, and surrounded by apartheid-
based neighbours, cultural differences were easily
dismissed as expressions of tribalism, and a threat to
the project of building a modern unitary state.
Contemporary development policies reproduce the
marginalisation of the San in a different way (Nthomang
2004).  The crude discrimination of colonial times, when
San were denied citizenship because they were
considered to be outside society, is gone. But they are
still perceived as people of the past, representing
adaptations that are out of time and place in a modern
developed nation. They are most notably defined by
what they are not.  The one piece of rural development
policy that most directly addresses the situation of the
San, the Remote Area Development Programme,
defines the target group as those living outside villages,
not speaking Setswana, lacking access to water, land,
livestock, and not having a hierarchical political
organisation – in short a full catalogue of social
problems -  rather than recognising  the strengths of
the culture they actually do  possess. It is a programme
that creates clients, not empowerment (Saugestad
2001a).
The relocation from the Game Reserve fits into a
vision of Botswana as a modern, prosperous and
homogenous state, where hunter-gatherers have no
place.  It is consistent with a development model that
sincerely wants to ‘improve the lives of its citizens’ as
quoted in the introduction, but which also claims to know
what is best for them.
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The relocation of Basarwa from the Central
Kalahari Game Reserve was motivated by nothing
other than a desire on the part of the Government
to improve their living conditions.  For as long as
Basarwa remained in the Game Reserve, it was
not possible to provide them with health, water
supply and other social amenities which are being
enjoyed by other citizens.  Living in the Game
reserve stereotyped the Basarwa to the hunter-
gatherer life-style which is unsustainable and also
not in their long–time interest. (Statement to the
UN  Working Group on Minorities, in Gazette
10.03.04 emphasis added)
Development models recognising the need for
diversity in development have become so common that
the Human Development  Report 2004 carried the
following declaration on its front cover:
Accommodating people’s demands for their
inclusion in society, for respect of their ethnicity,
rel igion, and language, takes more than
democracy and equitable growth.  Also needed
are mult icul tural  pol ic ies that recognize
differences, champion diversity and promote
cultural freedoms… – so that all people can
choose to be who they are.  (UNDP 2004)
The international indigenous movement is an
exponent of this general trend. It is more focused on
legal issues, and therefore more controversial, than the
general arguments for multiculturalism. However, the
emergence of indigenous organisations in Botswana,
as reflected for instance in the case raised about the
CKGR, is an expression of a global trend. This can be
disliked, but not ignored.
3.4 Outside influence
This takes us to a final point: the role of outside
influence. The Government of Botswana notes with
considerable irritation (and quite correctly) that there
would be no court case, if it had not been for the
international support provided.  The last time the
applicants asked for an adjournment to look for
additional funds from Europe, counsel for the
respondent did not hide his indignation: ‘We do not want
Europe to interfere and tell us what to do or not to do.
We resent their involvement in our affairs. They should
leave us alone’. (Mmegi 26.08.05). However, outside
involvement has taken two very different forms, and
the line between legitimate engagement and
inappropriate interference has become contested
territory.  The one trend is motivated by a human rights
and indigenous rights concern.  We will return to this.
The other trend pivots around the role of diamonds.
3.4.1 The diamonds
Diamonds are not an issue in the court case.
Nevertheless, the entire Survival International (SI)
campaign against the relocation from CKGR centres
on the role of diamonds as the reason for relocation,
and a call for international boycott. Their press releases
regularly state that:
The Botswana Government has been trying to
get the Gana and Gwi Bushmen off their
ancestral lands in the Central Kalahari Game
Reserve since the 1980s when Diamonds were
discovered.  Exploration concessions leaped
within a few days of the Bushmen being evicted
in 2002. (08.10.05)
The government claims that there are no plans for
diamond mining inside the CKGR, as the only known
mineral discovery, the Gope deposit, is not
commercially viable. However, the reserve is located
between two of the world’s larges diamond mines:
Orapa to the east and Jawaneng to the west, and SI
(2004) publishes ample evidence that prospecting has
increased after the 2002 relocation. It is quite likely that
profitable discoveries will be made, and if so, it is quite
likely that the Government, through its company
Debswana which is linked to de Beers, will mine (Good
2003).  The question is, does this matter? There is no
convincing explanation why the Botswana Government
should empty 52,000 km2 of human settlement in order
to mine one or two km2.  Given the size of the reserve,
a small foraging population would be a minor
inconvenience. Moreover, the applicants say they would
not object to mining ‘if it brings jobs to our children’.
The disturbance for wildlife, however, of mining and
road transport, might be substantial.
The ‘blood diamond’ campaign represents one of
the greatest enigmas of the SI operation, and has a
tremendous impact on a case in which it is not an issue.
It has a dubious empirical base, not in assuming that
there may be future mining operations, but in identifying
this as the driving force behind the Government of
Botswana’s relocation policy, and indeed its entire policy
towards the San. The argument diverts attention from
the basic problem: an authoritarian and patronising
model for development, elevating the preferred lifestyle
of the majority to the national norm. UN Special
Rapporteur Rodolfo Stavenhagen has warned against
the way this campaign has become a media event: ‘The
interests of the San people are not best served by a
public debate between an NGO based in London and
an international mining company’ (08.08.05/Reuters).
3.4.2 Indigenous rights and human rights
There are other procedures for international
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involvement that are less confrontational, and which
probably will have more impact in the longer run.
Examples of these are the inclusion of African
Indigenous Peoples in the United Nations systems, and
the emerging networks of Indigenous-to-Indigenous
collaboration.5 Another example of ‘constructive
engagement’ is the  Swedish Right Livelihood Award
2005, given to The First People of the Kalahari, and
Roy Sesana,  ‘… for resolute resistance against eviction
from their ancestral lands. And for upholding the right
to their traditional way of life.’ http://
www.rightlivelihood.org/recip/2005/first-people-of-the-
kalahari—roy-sesana.htm. It is a notable award in its
own right, and an  interesting side effect has been some
positive impact on public opinion in Botswana.
Perhaps the  most important initiative so far is the
report of the African Commission’s Working Group of
Experts on Indigenous Populations/communities,
adopted in 2003.  The report notes:
Articles 20 and 22 of the African Charter
emphasize that all people shall have the right to
existence and to the social, economic and cultural
development of their own choice and in conformity
with their own identity. Such fundamental collective
rights are to a large extent denied to indigenous
peoples.  (ACHPR 2005:107)
Like all other documents of this kind, its effects are
slow to come and hard to measure.  But the adoption
of the report provides an instrument that may throw
light on the situation of indigenous peoples in Africa,
and may be used to lobby African governments to
recognize indigenous peoples, their human rights
concerns, and their particular needs. Members of the
working group visited Botswana in June 2005, and the
forthcoming report will be important.
4 To conclude
No matter what the significance of international
attention, the solutions have to be found in Botswana.
The current court case will have an impact on two levels:
the case proper can be won - or lost; but there is also
public opinion and popular support that can be won -
or lost. So far the campaign waged by Survival
International has had a very negative impact not only
on the government, but also on the Botswana public,
who – unlike the international audience - can check
press statements against realities on the ground. This
is not denying the seriousness of confrontations that
have taken place between demonstrators and the
police, but to question whether ‘ethnic cleansing’ and
‘genocide’ appropriately describe what happens.
Writing about the San/Bushmen/Basarwa has for
centuries been dominated by outsider perceptions,
moving from contempt to exoticism and essentialism
(Skotnes 1996) to the current buzzword of ‘rights based’
approaches. Local media have until recently tended to
ignore the situation of the San, unless there has been
a conflict on which to report.  Seeing the court case as
a media-worthy conflict, coverage has been fairly
extensive, but comments have been stereotypical,
implying an ‘otherness’ to San issues, and a deviance
from the ‘normal’ Tswana life. Suddenly, the Right
Livelihood Award, brought comments (eg, Mmegi
11.10.05) where Sesana and other applicants appear
as regular persons, who stand out with their own history
and individuality. If this leap of imagination can be
sustained, much has been gained, irrespective of the
outcome of the court case. To ‘improve their lives’, the
many Voices of the San (Le Roux & White 2004) must
be heard. There is no other way.
Endnotes
1 Depending on context I use the term San, which
is the term preferred by San organisations,
Basarwa  as the official term in Botswana, and
Bushmen when referring to history.
2 The official figures for the 1997 relocation were:
1239 to New Xade, 500 to Kaudwane. Ikeya
(2001:188) estimates that out of a total of 1700
people at that time living in the CKGR, 1130 were
moved out, while 575 stayed.
The  figures in 2002 were: 342 to New Xade, 179
to Kaudwane, 17 to Xere (a new settlement in
Central District).
3 The appl icat ion was f i rst  dismissed on
technicalities, then admitted by the Court of
Appeal.  There were delays caused by the need
to raise money for the case, which was finally
brought before a panel of three judges in the High
Court in July 2004.
4 Legal advisers when the case was prepared were
Glyn Williams and Roger Chennells of Chennells
Albertyn, of Cape Town, the firm that successfully
negotiated the ¤Khomani land claim in South Africa
in 1999.
5 For instance support to the First People of the
Kalahari channelled through the Saami Council
(Borchgrevink  2005).
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